Saboteurs and Military Justice by Kraus, Rose
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 17 




Saboteurs and Military Justice 
Rose Kraus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Kraus, Rose (1942) "Saboteurs and Military Justice," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 17 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
SABOTEURS AND MILITARY JUSTICE
The legal profession in wartime America must focus its attention
on matters that occupy the immediate interest of the country in times
of such peril, as do all other members of society. The recent execu-
tion of the eight spies brought into action a military commission that
had been in disuse in this country since the Civil War.
Under the laws of war, death is the penalty for espionage com-
mitted behind Army lines by an enemy not in uniform. The life and
death of one thus captured pivots on rules of military law and proce-
dure as administered by a military tribunal. In time of war a spy,
whether he is in the military service or not and whether his offense is
committed within or without a fort or camp or a five-mile zone, is
triable before a general courts-martial. By international and military
law, spies are within the jurisdiction of military tribunals.1 The war
power vested in Congress by the Constitution incidentally authorizes
Congress to create military tribunals with customary jurisdiction.
While courts-martial are recognized by the Federal Constitution,
having been in existence prior to the ratification of that instrument by
virtue of the adoption of the first American Articles of War in 1775,
they are not a part of the federal judicial system. They are more
properly a part of the executive branch of government, for they are
essential to the government of the army and navy. Until the sentence
of a court-martial has been approved by the proper commanding offi-
cer, it is not effective. This is because these tribunals are adjuncts to
the executive power, rather than part of the judicial function. Never-
theless, courts-martial must carry out their duties in a judicial manner
fundamental principles of justice and rules of law and evidence must
be adhered to. Irregularities must be avoided before or during the
trial of a case by a court-martial; these proceedings may be attacked
in a civil court by having a general prisoner seek his liberty on a writ
of habeas corpus which will challenge the jurisdiction of the court.
Lack of due process violative of the prisoner's constitutional rights
may be alleged. The record, therefore, should leave no room for
doubt as to the regularity of proceedings, or as to the jurisdiction of
the court and its members' legal eligibility.2
1 ARTICLEs OF WAR 82, "Any person who in time of war shall be found
lurking or acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters,
or encampments of the United States or elsewhere shall be tried by general
courts-martial or military commission and shall on conviction suffer death."
2 The jurisdiction of courts-martial and validity of any judgment rendered
depend upon the following indispensable prerequisites:
(a) It must be convened by an official empowered to appoint it (e.g.,
President).
(b) The membership must be qualified both as to number and compe-
tency to sit as a court.
(c) The court so constituted must be invested by act of Congress with
power to try the person and offense charged.
1942 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Purely military offenses, such as desertion or conduct unbecom-
ing an officer and a gentleman, are under the exclusive jurisdiction of
courts-martial; other crimes may be punishable by a civil court or a
court-martial. It is often necessary to determine which shall have
jurisdiction.
In time of war it would seem that the military authorities are not
required to deliver offenders to the state authorities.8 However, it
has been held that the Articles of War enacted in 1916 do not deprive
the civil courts, either in time of peace or war, of the concurrent juris-
diction previously vested in them over crimes against either federal or
state law committed within the United States by persons subject to
military law.4  It is claimed that the basis of the jurisdiction of the
military authorities over the enemy spy is that he is found lurking or
acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifications, quarters or en-
campments of the United States. That only if a spy is caught any-
where in the zone of military operations may he be court-martialed
and executed. That this is the basis, the court claimed, is indicated
by the fact that if he escaped and returned to his own lines and is later
captured, he may not be tried or punished as a spy, but must be
treated as a prisoner of warfare.5
The principal characteristic of this offense is a clandestine dis-
simulation of the true object sought-an endeavor to obtain informa-
tion with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. Thus
soldiers not wearing disguise, dispatch riders, whether soldiers or
civilians, and persons in aircraft who carry out their mission openly
and who penetrated hostile lines are not to be considered spies, for
the reason that, while they may have resorted to concealment, they
have practiced no dissimulation.6 It is necessary to prove an intent
to communicate information to the hostile party. The proof must
include evidence not only that the accused was found at a certain place
within our zone of operations, acting clandestinely, or under false
pretenses, but also that he was obtaining, or endeavoring to obtain,
(d) Also certain procedural requirements are matters of vital conse-
quence.-MILITARY LAW AND COURT MARTIAL PROCEDURE, p. 15.
3 ARTIcLEs OF WAR 82, cited supra note 1.
4 United States v. Hirsch, 254 Fed. 109 (1918).
5 In the last World War a Russian national was sent to the United States
by Von Eckhardt, the German ambassador to Mexico, carrying a cipher message
in German consular code which constituted his credentials as a German spy. He
confided to two men who accompanied him (who without his knowledge, were
American and British service men) that he was coming to the United States to
"blow the works up" and that he had in the past engaged in exploding and
wrecking munition barges and powder magazines, etc. Immediately upon
touching the border, he was apprehended by military authorities. The court
held that as the offense had been committed outside of the field of military
operations and by a person not a member of the military or naval forces in a
district where regular civilian courts were functioning, the trial by a military
tribunal was illegal. Opinion of Attorney General Gregory, Nov. 25, 1918,
31 Op. Atty. Gen. 356.
6 SCHILLER, MILITARY LAW AND DEFENsE LEGISLATION (1941) 463.
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information with intent to communicate the same to the enemy. The
intent to communicate information will very readily be inferred on
proof of a deceptive insinuation of the accused among our forces.
However, this inference may be overcome by very clear evidence that
the person had come for a comparatively innocent purpose, as a visit
to family or disguised so as to reach his own lines.7
There are three kinds of court-martial: general, special and sum-
mary. General court-martial consists of not less than five officers in
military service of the United States. In practice, usually nine or
eleven officers are appointed in order to permit the court to function
even when some of its members are disqualified, sick, or absent from
the post. The Articles of War impose certain restrictions as to those
who may sit in judgment upon members of the military establishment.
Thus an officer is legally incompetent if he is the accuser or witness
for the prosecution.8 To be an eligible witness to sit on a court-
martial one must be a "commissioned" officer. Officers suspended
from rank may not sit on courts-martial during such suspension. Chap-
lains are not customarily assigned to this detail, but their presence
will not invalidate the proceedings. The special court-martial is
composed of any number of officers not less than three.9 While a
summary court has but one officer.10
It is of extreme importance to an accused whether or not he will
be tried by a military or a civil tribunal, because the procedure of the
two differ greatly.
In military tribunals, before trial, any person subject to military
law and charged with crime or with a serious offense under the
Articles of War may be placed in confinement, or arrest, as circum-
stances may require." The formal written accusation in court-
martial practice consists of two parts, and is equivalent to a complaint
or technical charge and the specification. The charge, where the
offense alleged is a violation of the articles merely, indicates the
articles the accused is alleged to have violated, while the specification
sets forth the specific facts and circumstances relied upon as consti-
7 Where a soldier of the enemy's army separated from it on its retreat
from Maryland in 1864, was arrested, after wandering about in disguise within
our lines, for a month, seeking an opportunity to make his way back to the
enemy's forces and join his regiment, it was held, he was not properly charge-
able with being a spy. Dig. J. A. Gen. 709, par. 4.
s ARTiCLFs OF WAR 8, 9. A conviction by a court-martial convened by a
department commander, who is also accuser, should be set aside. In re Bird,
Fed. Cas. No. 1428.
9 ARTcLEs or WAR 6.10 Id. 7.
" Where the offense charged is minor, the accused (whether officer or
enlisted man) is placed in arrest. If crime is serious, the person charged is
held in confinement. Arrest and confinement differ in the type of restraint
involved. The order fixing the physical limits of the arrest imposes a moral
restraint, while confinement is, in one form or another, a physical restraint
MUNSON AND JAEGER, MILITARY LAW AND COURT MARTIAL PROCEDURE(1941) 31.
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tuting the violation. Numerous charges may be made against one
person in a single document and it is entirely immaterial whether they
are related or not; however, it is not usual to join charges alleging
serious offenses to others of a minor character, unless the latter serve
to clarify the nature of the former. The charge is drawn very simply,
but must state an offense in such a way that if the facts are proved,
accused must be guilty of some offense. 12  There should be no evi-
dentiary matter in the specification nor should there be conclusions of
law.13 Each specification together with the charge under which it is
placed constitutes a separate accusation. New and separate charges
preferred after others have been preferred are known as "additional
charges". Such charges may relate to transactions not known at the
time the original charges were preferred or they may relate to offenses
committed after the original charges were preferred.14  Charges of
this character do not require a separate trial, but subject to the usual
procedure may be tried with the original charges.
While civilians may initiate charges against a member of the
military establishment, the law requires that they be signed and sworn
to by a person subject to military law.
No charge will be referred for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof is made. This investigation will in-
clude inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges.
At such investigation full opportunity is given the accused to cross-
examine witnesses against him and to present anything he may desire
in his own behalf either as a defense or mitigation. An affidavit is
added that the affiant has personal knowledge of the facts, or that he
has investigated them and has satisfied himself as to their accuracy;
which of these is the case must appear clearly from the affidavit.15
Care must be taken that the acts forming the basis of the charges
did not occur at a time too remote to sustain them. The statute of
limitations may be set up by the accused as a bar to his trial or pun-
ishment either by a special plea, or by evidence of the statute, and its
12 Thus merely stating that "Private Doe shot Private Roe intentionally"
is not sufficient, for Doe may have been so ordered (as a member of a firing
squad). If the specification fails to state an offense, the proceeding is a nullity,
even if accused pleads guilty. MUNSON AND JAEGER, MILITARY LAW AND
COURT MARTIAL PROCEDURE (1941) 34.
13 Note the similarity here to the civil practice requirement under N. Y.
C. P. A. § 241, "every pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of
the material facts, without unnecessary repetition, on which the party pleading
relies, but not the evidence by which they. are to be proved." Also the sub-
sidiary principles of pleading-that a pleading must contain the ultimate facts
as distinguished from primary facts or evidentiary matter and a pleading should
not contain conclusions of law. PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON N. Y.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1937) 339, 340.
14 Under N. Y. Civil Practice there could not be such joinder of causes
of action. It would be necessary to serve a supplemental complaint under
N. Y. C. P. A. § 245a. Id. 660.




applicability, introduced under a plea to the general issue, but without
such evidence a plea of not guilty does not assert the bar of the statute.
The time elapsed is computed, for this purpose, from the date of the
commission of the offense to the date of arraignment. Absences from
the United States and any period during which some manifest im-
pediment prevented the government from prosecuting the accused
must be deducted from the statutory period of limitation. (Such as
accused's absence because a prisoner of war, etc.) However, mere
inability to find him, because of his concealment or fraud, will not
operate as a manifest impediment.' 6
At the military trial the members of a general or special courts-
martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate
for cause stated to the court. The court determines the relevancy
and validity thereof. Each side is entitled to one peremptory chal-
lenge, but the law member of the court may not be challenged except
for cause.1 7
Pleas in court-martial procedure include plea to the jurisdiction,
plea in abatement, plea in bar of trial and pleas to the general issue.
An objection to which a plea to the jurisdiction is applicable cannot
be waived and may be asserted at any time. A plea in abatement
operates merely to delay trial and is based upon some objection to a
charge or specification as indefinite or redundant. Exemption from
liability to be tried or punished may be claimed under a plea in bar
of trial.
The rules of evidence applicable in court-martial procedure are
those generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in district
courts of the United States. In order to convict of an offense the
court must be satifised beyond a reasonable doubt. Permissible find-
ings include guilty; not guilty; guilty with exception with or without
substitution and guilty of any substitution.' 8 Thus if the evidence
fails to prove the offense charged, but does prove the commission of a
lesser offense necessarily inclusive in the charge, the court may by its
findings except certain words of the specification and substitute others.
When the court is ready to vote on the guilt or innocence of the
accused, it does so by secret ballot.'9 With the exception of the
mandatory death sentence (which requires unanimity) two-thirds of
the members must vote affirmatively to convict a person, except that
6 N. Y. C. P. A. § 19 suspends tolling of the statute of limitations in like
manner.
17 Under N. Y. Practice, in a civil in a court of record each party may
exercise not more than six peremptory challenges. In a court not of record
each party may exercise not more than three challenges. "Each party" nor-
mally signifies each side to the controversy. The number of challenges for
cause is not subject to any numerical limitation. PRAsHKER, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON N. Y. PLEADING AND PRAcTicE (2d ed. 1937, Supp. II, 1942) 436-
438.
18 MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTiAL 78.19 ARTicLEs OF WAR 3L
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three-fourths is required if the sentence is for life or in excess of ten
years.20
To the extent that the punishment is discretionary the sentence
should provide for a legal, appropriate and adequate punishment. In the
exercise of any discretion the court may have in fixing punishment, it
should consider, among other factors, the character of the accused as
given on former discharges, the number and character of the previous
convictions, the circumstances extenuating or aggravating the offense
itself; or any collateral feature made material by limitations on pun-
ishments. Where acquittal is the result it must be announced in open
court.21 In other cases it may be done under such regulations as the
President of the United States shall prescribe. Sentences once ap-
proved can only be suspended by action of the Secretary of War or
the officer having general court-martial jurisdiction over the offen-
der. This does not extend to sentences of death,2 2 but includes dis-
honorable discharge.
Military courts seem uniquely fit to dispense military justice and
civil jurisdiction over the matter seems quite superfluous.
RosE KRAus.
20 Id. 43.
21 Id. 29.
22 Id. 52.
[ VOL. 17
